Insolvency law, restructuring law and modern financial markets by Paterson, Sarah
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2577742 
Insolvency Law, Restructuring 
Law and Modern 
Financial Markets
Sarah Paterson
LSE L AW  POLIC Y BRIEFING SERIES
POLICY BRIEFING 8     2015
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2577742 
In the US, the American Bank-ruptcy Inst i tute launched a commission to study reform of Chapter 11 in light of these new 
market dynamics which reported 
shortly before Christmas 2014 (http://
commission.abi.org/). Across much 
of Europe, reform is underway or 
under consideration. In England the 
flexibility of the common law has 
enabled lawyers to adapt procedures 
designed for a different finance 
market to accommodate the needs 
of the new one, so that the case 
for reform has not been pressing. 
However, given the momentum for 
reform elsewhere, we should pause 
to consider how well these pragmatic 
adaptat ions work for  modern 
financial markets. Moreover, the 
European Commission has issued a 
recommendation on a new approach 
to business failure and insolvency 
which encourages member states to 
put in place effective restructuring 
mechanisms. English law does 
not meet all of the Commission’s 
suggestions and we should consider 
whether the points of difference are 
based on sound policy judgments, or 
merely a reluctance to reset a mind-
set fixed in a different era. We can 
then be an effective part of the wider 
European debate.
ISSUES FOR 
RESTRUCTURING LAW
Choice between sale and 
restructuring 
First ,  we must decide whether 
there is an explicit role for the law 
in steering creditor choice between 
restructuring the company on the 
one hand or selling its business and 
assets to a third party on the other. 
Historically, notwithstanding some 
law on the books which might have 
been used to influence this choice, 
English law in action has taken a 
benign approach, largely leaving 
it to creditors to decide whether 
the company should continue in 
operation or whether it should be 
allowed to fail. US bankruptcy law 
has been more interventionist and 
it is an explicit policy objective of 
Chapter 11 to steer the parties 
towards a restructur ing of the 
company rather than a sale of its 
business. This is achieved by handing 
management significant veto rights 
on the assumption that management 
will favour a restructuring and the 
retention of their jobs. Until very 
recently these differences of approach 
had seemed to become less acute, 
as reform of the Uniform Commercial 
Code in the US made it easier for a 
senior secured class with security 
over all of the assets to emerge. This 
security interest enables the creditors 
to lay down conditions for access to 
cash to finance the Chapter 11 case, 
enabling them to control decision-
making. However, the recent report 
and recommendations from the ABI 
make a number of suggestions which 
appear to reaffirm a role for the law 
of corporate distress in steering the 
choice between restructuring and 
insolvency, reaffirming the traditionally 
different philosophical approach 
between England and the US.
I  suggest that the quest ion of 
whether the law should steer the 
choice between restructuring and 
sale remains l ive for smal l  and 
medium sized companies and is an 
issue which we should debate in 
that context. The ABI Commission 
has made specific recommendations 
for a restructuring regime for small 
and medium sized enterprises and I 
suggest that we also consider SMEs 
as a special case. However, in a recent 
working paper, Rethinking the Law of 
Corporate Distress in the Twenty-First 
Century, (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract _id=2526677) 
I argue that the distressed debt 
market has solved the issue for large 
and larger mid-cap companies. This 
is because the distressed debt market 
exists to maximise profit rather than 
minimise loss. Thus it seeks to identify 
cases in which the value of the 
company if it continues to operate 
will be greater than its value if the 
business is sold at the time of the 
restructuring, and provides an exit 
mechanism for senior creditors who 
would otherwise have preferred sale 
of the business, buying their debt 
ahead of any debt for equity swap. 
Allocation of value in a 
restructuring
The distressed debt market does 
not solve the problem of deciding 
who should get what in the ensuing 
exchange of  debt  for  (usua l l y 
unlisted) securities. In Europe this 
has traditionally been dealt with 
by benchmarking the equity which 
creditors receive against the amount 
they would have got if the business 
and assets had been sold instead – in 
other words, checking that creditors 
would not have been better off in 
insolvency.  However, if the market 
is depressed the market price at 
the time of the restructuring may 
be lower than it would have been 
if the business had been sold at a 
later date so that the creditors who 
do receive an equity allocation may 
make a substantial profit if they sell 
the business after the market has 
recovered. In the US this problem 
is solved by the ‘bargaining and 
litigation’ approach. The parties 
are left to negotiate value using 
traditional valuation techniques such 
as discounted cash flow, comparable 
pricing and private equity valuation 
methodology. If the parties cannot 
agree, the bankruptcy judge will 
make a determination. However, 
this approach is highly subjective and 
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leads to concerns of increased time, 
cost, delay, arbitrary allocation of 
value and, possibly, increased pricing 
for senior secured credit.
Some US scholars have proposed 
an alternative ‘options approach’ 
to solve the problems with both the 
auction approach and the bargaining 
and litigation approach. In the options 
approach the capital structure is reset 
so that those creditors who have debt 
covered by the value of the business 
at the time of the restructuring 
receive equity (so-called ‘in-the-
money’ creditors), and all others 
receive an option with a strike price 
equal to the claims ranking ahead of 
them. The ABI Commission proposals 
do not adopt this approach (which 
might lead to some rather unwieldy 
capital structures) but do propose 
using a hypothetical option structure 
and options pricing methodology to 
determine whether junior creditors 
should receive anything in the new 
bargain. Interestingly, the proposals 
do not dedicate much time to the 
question of whether, where junior 
creditors do receive an allocation, it 
should be after senior creditors have 
recovered their original investment, 
or whether senior creditors should 
receive a premium to reflect their 
new risk. 
I suggest a three stage approach for 
the UK. First, there is an empirical 
question as to the consequences 
of the different approaches for the 
pricing of senior secured credit, 
the depth and strength of the 
debt markets (particularly as the 
UK becomes less bank-dominated) 
and for equity financing. Once we 
have the answer to the empirical 
questions, we can decide which 
va luat ion approach we prefer. 
Elsewhere I have argued that this 
preferred valuation approach should 
then be clearly spelt out in regulation 
for insolvency practitioners so that 
they can be clear when it is legitimate 
to cut junior stakeholders out and 
when they should receive some value. 
We may also decide that reforms are 
needed to our legal procedures in 
order to reflect the chosen approach, 
including the extent of court involve-
ment and the conditions for access to 
the procedures. 
Should a restructuring 
moratorium be available?
English law has apparently operated 
without too much difficulty in the 
Great Recession without a moratorium 
in the legal procedures used to 
implement large restructurings. The 
usual argument for a moratorium 
in distress is that it reduces the 
incentive for individual creditors to 
take action to sell assets, breaking 
up the company and reducing value. 
I have argued (http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2526677) that the distressed debt 
market has also resolved this issue 
in large restructurings by providing 
an alternative means of exit for 
creditors who would otherwise 
have enforced. However, I have 
argued that there may still be a case 
for a moratorium in restructuring 
in order to enable directors to 
suspend payments on debt during 
restructuring negotiations to en-
courage bargaining. Once again, 
different considerations apply for 
small and medium sized enterprises 
where the distressed debt market 
does not operate as effectively and I 
would suggest that the issues should 
be reviewed separately for each part 
of the market.
Financing a restructuring
Finally, the vexed question of whether 
a special regime is needed for finance 
raised during a restructuring case 
would benefit from a new appraisal. 
Here greater research into the role 
debtor in possess ion f inancing 
now plays in Chapter 11 would be 
beneficial. Traditionally, third party 
f inanciers have stood ready to 
provide DIP financing as a source of 
liquidity for the restructuring case. 
However, US commentators suggest 
a changing role for DIP financing, 
with distressed debt purchasers 
using the regime as a strategic tool 
to gain control.  At the same time, 
we need to understand the extent to 
which conditions for access to cash 
collateral affect the financing needs 
of the debtor. 
ISSUES FOR INSOLVENCY LAW
Thus far I have concentrated on the 
need to review how our restructuring 
regime operates in the twenty-first 
century. But I also suggest that 
it is time to consider whether our 
inso lvency reg ime operates  as 
effectively as it might to maximise 
sale proceeds where the creditors 
decide that they are no longer 
willing to remain invested and the 
distressed debt market identifies no 
restructuring surplus. This requires 
examination of many of the same 
issues but in a different context. For 
example, do we continue to see a 
role for the trading administration 
given the rise of the pre-packaged 
sale and, if we do, is our moratorium 
strong enough to promote sale of 
the business as a going concern? Is 
our finance regime fit for purpose? 
And, given the changing nature of 
commerce, is it time to change our 
approach to asset classes such as 
intellectual property rights, currently 
grounded in nineteenth century 
concepts of property and contract?
In short, it is time to consider whe-
ther the regime which we have 
pragmatically adapted for changing 
conditions is really the one which we 
want – or whether we need to put 
time and resource into a real reform 
effort. 
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